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The objective of this paper is to present an analysis of cognitive 
techniques in the light of associative learning processes. We 
question their traditional conceptualization in terms of variables 
and processes qualitatively different from behavior, and present 
them as verbal techniques. From our perspective, not only is 
their structure essentially verbal –that is, they are implemented 
through speech–, but what they deal with is verbal as well: the 
clients’ linguistic thoughts, internalized forms of manifest verbal 
behavior that may have a fundamental role in the way we interact 
with the environment. Our proposition draws from a necessary 
revision of the concepts of thought, language and behavior, and 
is based on Mowrer’s (1954) explanation of meaning transfers. 
His contributions within the framework of Pavlovian conditioning 
could be, in our opinion, the perfect supplement to the operant 
explanations retrieved by contextual therapies (RFT; Hayes, 
Barnes-Holmes, & Roche, 2001). As a result of this analysis, an 
explanation of cognitive techniques, their functioning and their 
indubitable effi cacy in therapeutic change can be formulated 
without resorting to explanations and concepts that are a burden 
for the formal development of psychology as a science.
The emergence of cognitive techniques in Behavior Modifi cation 
(BM) led to so-called Cognitive-Behavior Modifi cation (CBM) 
and was closely related to the situation of psychology in the 1970s. 
The general lack of knowledge about neo-behaviorism (Skinner, 
1957, 1969; Kantor, 1921, 1975) and the frequent confusion 
between methodological and radical behaviorism facilitated the 
rise of cognitivism as an answer to the alleged reductionism of 
behaviorism. Consequently, behavior was replaced by the mind 
as the primary object of study of psychology. Researchers started 
to focus more on the inferred central processes that supposedly 
explained behavior; a sort of “mind-centrism” that resembles the 
current “brain-centrism” (Pérez, 2012), where Neurosciences and 
Psychobiology displace the research on behavior itself.
Research on information processing and the powerful 
development of computational sciences and artifi cial intelligence 
deeply affected psychology. Its main goal became to adequately 
characterize the functioning of the processes responsible for 
acquiring, manipulating, storing, and retrieving information 
for decision-making (Dennett, 1978). Moreover, some research 
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Abstract Resumen
Background: the main purpose of this study is to offer an alternative 
explanatory account of the functioning of cognitive techniques that is 
based on the principles of associative learning and highlights their verbal 
nature. The traditional accounts are questioned and analyzed in the light 
of the situation of psychology in the 1970s. Method: conceptual analysis 
is employed to revise the concepts of language, cognition and behavior. 
Several operant- and Pavlovian-based approaches to these phenomena are 
presented, while particular emphasis is given to Mowrer’s (1954) approach 
and Ryle (1949) and Wittgenstein’s (1953) philosophical contributions 
to the fi eld. Conclusions: several logical problems are found in regard 
to the theoretical foundations of cognitive techniques. A combination of 
both operant and Pavlovian paradigms based on the above-mentioned 
approaches is offered as an alternative explanatory account of cognitive 
techniques. This new approach could overcome the conceptual fragilities 
of the cognitive standpoint and its dependence upon constructs of dubious 
logical and scientifi c validity.
Keywords: Cognitive techniques, language, behavior, Pavlovian 
conditioning.
Técnicas cognitivas y lenguaje: un regreso a los orígenes conductuales. 
Antecedentes: el objetivo de este trabajo es proponer una alternativa 
explicativa al funcionamiento de las técnicas cognitivas basándonos en 
los procesos de aprendizaje asociativo y destacando su carácter verbal; 
se cuestionan las explicaciones tradicionales, que se analizan a la luz de 
la situación de la psicología en los años 70 del siglo pasado. Método: 
se emplea el análisis conceptual para revisar los conceptos de lenguaje, 
cognición y conducta y se presentan las propuestas desarrolladas para su 
estudio desde planteamientos operantes y pavlovianos, haciendo especial 
hincapié en las aportaciones de Mowrer (1954) y en los planteamientos 
fi losófi cos de Ryle (1949) y Wittgenstein (1953). Conclusiones: se 
detectan una serie de problemas lógicos en los fundamentos de las terapias 
cognitivas. La combinación de los paradigmas operante y pavloviano y 
su soporte fi losófi co en las propuestas señaladas suponen una superación 
de dichas fl aquezas y permiten una explicación del funcionamiento de 
las técnicas cognitivas sin necesidad de recurrir a constructos de dudosa 
validez lógica y científi ca.
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fi ndings (experimental confi rmation of the role of cognitive 
variables in behavior performance (Ader & Tatum, 1961; Baron 
& Kaufman, 1966) or the results that showed that associations 
between words were due more to their meaning than to their 
phonetic similarity) seemed to imply that associative learning was 
insuffi cient to explain behavior.
This is when the so-called “cognitive leap” takes place 
(Mahoney, 1974): techniques developed by clinicians from a 
psychodynamic tradition, like Ellis’ rational-emotional therapy 
and Beck’s cognitive therapy (Beck, 1967; Beck, Rush, Shaw, & 
Emery, 1979; Ellis, 1962; Ellis & Grieger, 1977) are included in 
BM, thus leading to Cognitive Behavior Modifi cation (CBM). 
CBM’s main characteristic is that mediational variables are taken 
as the causes of manifest behavior. Thus, in order to modify a 
client’s problematic behavior, the intervention must focus on a 
series of cognitive variables and processes whose change ultimately 
determines any behavioral change. That this kind of explanation 
was used in the 1970’s, given the aforementioned situation of 
psychology in general and BM in particular, is understandable. But 
in light of the approaches that arose in the 1990’s, fi rmly supported 
by the experimental advances in the fi eld of verbal behavior, it 
is questionable whether explanations based on these mediational 
variables can be upheld. It is also worth asking whether another 
kind of explanation could be achieved, an experimentally and 
logically well-founded explanation where circular concepts that 
needlessly clutter psychological intervention wouldn’t take part. 
Maybe it was the ignorance about the experimental and theoretical 
foundations of associative processes and the behavioral approach 
to language what led to the popularization of ad hoc constructs 
created by CBM to explain what isn’t easily explained. As Pérez 
(1996) said, following Skinner, the verbal fi eld offers the solution 
to the only problem subjectivism might pose to a science of 
behavior.
Method
 
In order to introduce our thesis, we fi rst call the foundations of 
cognitive techniques and their traditional conceptualization into 
question. As an example, we analyze Beck’s proposal (Beck et al., 
1979) and its tripartite organization of the mind: cognitive facts 
at the surface, cognitive processes at a deeper level and, lastly, 
cognitive schemata, which are inaccessible to consciousness and 
ultimately determine human behavior. Cognitive schemata can be 
altered by means of linguistic tools, mainly the Socratic method. 
This technique employs the maieutic method in order to help the 
clients question and replace their maladaptive thoughts with more 
adaptive ones. This cognitive change progressively fosters new 
behavioral strategies, which, in turn, are the only “evidence” that 
the cognitive schemata have changed.
Besides its tautological character, this rationale entails the 
existence of a “second substance” with causal powers on behavior: 
the mental, separated from the material (environmental and 
organic-structural). This, in turn, entails a qualitative distinction 
between physical and mental processes that is not only unjustifi ed 
and opposed to a solid philosophical foundation for the scientifi c 
analysis of psychological problems; it is also unnecessary. If our only 
evidence for cognitive change is precisely the observed behavioral 
change, where is the explanatory virtue of cognitive schemata? 
From our perspective, a thorough review of the concepts of 
cognition, language and behavior leads us to the conclusion that 
many of the philosophical problems encountered by psychology 
are just pseudo-problems caused by a loose employment of mental 
terminology and an inappropriate conception of the mental.
Our proposal is grounded in some contributions of the 
contemporary philosophy of mind and language, specifi cally on 
Ryle (1949) and Wittgenstein’s (1953) anti-descriptivist and anti-
factualist approaches. From their perspective, our language is 
not only intended to describe the world, but has a wide array of 
functions (hence the “anti-descriptivism”). Accordingly, many of 
the mental concepts that we employ in daily speech contexts do not 
stand for factual entities with causal powers on behavior (hence 
the “anti-factualism”). In Ryle’s (1949) terms, the reifi cation of 
the mental (beliefs, desires, schemata, etc.) constitutes a category 
mistake, rooted in the “Descartes’ myth” (res extensa [bodily, 
physical processes] vs. res cogitans [mental processes]). Thus, 
mental concepts are just useful terms that we employ to justify 
behavior (that is, to make our actions intelligible) (Pinedo, 2014; 
Ryle, 1949; Wittgenstein, 1953). In a similar vein, Sellars (1956) 
proposed that our mentalist explanations of behavior do not 
pertain to the realm of nomological explanations (those that state 
the causes of behavior), but to the realm of normative explanations 
(those that we commonly employ when we give reasons for our 
behavior). Although both types of explanation intend to provide 
an answer to the whys and wherefores of behavior, they do so in 
different ways: the former are scientifi c explanations, while the 
latter are normative justifi cations. 
However, from a radical behaviorist standpoint there is at least 
one mental concept that holds a relevant role in our nomological 
explanations of behavior: the concept of thought (covert events 
occurring “under the skin”) (Skinner, 1974). Given the scope 
of the paper, we will only focus on linguistic thoughts (covert 
verbal behavior). According to the radical behaviorist standpoint, 
covert verbal behavior has its roots in manifest verbal behavior. 
Likewise, Vygotsky (1962) observed that adults fi rst verbally guide 
the children’s behavior; consequently, the kids learn to emit self-
guiding verbalizations to monitor their own behavior; fi nally, their 
verbal community teaches them to “keep those verbalizations for 
themselves”. We could say that adults establish fairly systematic 
operant programs that end up with the internalization of social 
speech (Alcaraz, 1990; Mowrer, 1954).
Verbal control of behavior is what Skinner (1969) called “rule-
governed behavior”. A rule is a verbal description of a behavioral 
contingency (either manifest or covert) that can affect our behavior 
in a similar way to the described contingencies themselves (Alcaraz, 
1990; Mowrer, 1954; Stemmer, 1973; Tonneau, 2004; Tonneau & 
González, 2004). The relationship between verbalizations and the 
events described by them constitutes the symbolic function of 
language (Tonneau, 2001). This function is the key to understand 
how rules connect us with temporally and spatially distant events; 
in Mowrer’s terms, “it enables us to go from the concrete to 
the abstract, from the here-and-now to the “not here, not now” 
(Mowrer, 1954: 662). From our perspective, the symbolic function 
is to be understood in terms of the Pavlovian processes that operate 
in language.
Mowrer went beyond the Pavlovian conception of language as 
a “second signal system” and conceived the symbolic relations 
among events in terms of “sentences”. A “sentence”, in Mowrer’s 
(1954: 665) terms, “is a conditioning device [whose] chief effect is 
to produce new associations, new learning”. He distinguished four 
types: thing-thing, thing-sign, sign-thing and sign-sign. These four 
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types of sentences establish the Pavlovian processes that effect 
“meaning transfers” among both linguistic and non-linguistic 
events.
The current “islamophobia” constitutes a good example of 
a (deplorable) meaning transfer. According to Mowrer (1954), 
the “meaning” of an event (either a word or a thing) is just the 
set of sensory-motor reactions elicited by that event. Thus, the 
association between the words “Muslim” and “terrorist” cannot be 
explained in terms of a simple second-order conditioning process, 
for that would imply to treat both words as synonyms (something 
unthinkable even for the most extreme case of islamophobia). 
Consequently, he proposes the concept of “mediating response”. 
To understand this concept, fi rst we need to examine how the 
words “Muslim” and “terrorist” acquired their meanings in 
the fi rst place (fi gure 1 shows the conditioning sequences). The 
perceptual contact with a Muslim person (unconditioned stimulus, 
US) elicits a set of unconditioned responses (UR) that we could 
call R
M
. After n thing-sign trials, the word “Muslim” becomes a 
conditioned stimulus (CS) that elicits a conditioned response (CR): 
r
M
, a “detachable” component of R
M
 (Mowrer, 1954: 667).
Let’s assume that a similar process occurs with the word 
“terrorist”. When a person hears the sign-sign sentence “all 
Muslims are terrorists” (second-order conditioning), r
M
 is 
associated with the meaning of “terrorist” (r
T
). However, for the 
Muslim person to be associated with the word “terrorist” the 
mediating response is needed: when R
M
 is elicited by the visual 
contact with a Muslim person, its component r
M
 is also elicited; 
this mediating response, in turn, elicits r
T
 [Muslim–R
M
 (r
M
–r
T
)]. 
The mediating response allows us to explain how the alteration 
of the meaning of “Muslim” produces an alteration in the set of 
responses elicited by a fl esh and blood Muslim person.
Once the [Muslim–R
M
 (r
M
–r
T
)] complex has been established, 
it can act as an Sd for escape or avoidance operants (e.g., keeping 
a distance from Muslim people), thus hindering contact with 
excellent Muslims (the over-whelming majority) and the subsequent 
counterconditioning. Further associations between “Muslim” and 
“terrorist” through self-verbalizations and the constant news on 
ISIS barbarity explain (although don’t justify) why “Muslim” is 
becoming a highly aversive term for many people.
Tonneau’s work (2001, 2004; Tonneau & González, 2004) 
provides an updated Pavlovian approach to language: relations 
among linguistic and non-linguistic events constitute “functional 
equivalence relations”, which are established through “function 
transfer” processes. What characterizes the symbolic processes 
that operate in language is that function transfer can be achieved 
without a direct pairing between two stimuli. If a signal-stimulus 
X is paired with a target-stimulus A, a signal-stimulus Y is paired 
with an US B and, fi nally, X and Y are paired, function transfer 
from B to A is achieved even though these stimuli were never 
paired directly. Furthermore, the establishment of correlations 
among stimuli would suffi ce to produce function transfer.
Among the most important contributions of Tonneau’s analyses, 
the exposition of the distinctive explanatory roles of Pavlovian and 
operant conditioning in the study of symbolic processes must be 
highlighted. According to Tonneau (2001: 25), operant processes 
might play a fundamental role in the solution to the so-called 
“extinction problem”: due to the absence of subsequent systematic 
pairings between sign-stimuli (“apple”) and thing-stimuli (an 
apple itself), the capacity of the former to elicit responses akin to 
those elicited by the latter should decrease over time. However, 
this is not the case; we don’t need to pair the word “apple” with 
real apples every so often to continue to be competent users of 
such word. According to Tonneau (2011: 25) operant reinforcement 
might affect “the probability that active stimulus correlations keep 
transferring functions from one stimulus to another”.
However, if we follow the Wittgensteinian approach to 
language, operant processes might not only take part in the 
maintenance of functional equivalence relations, but also in their 
genesis. Wittgenstein (1953) points out that it is not possible to 
learn the association between a linguistic sign and its referent 
US RM
Muslim
CS rM
“Muslim”
US RT
Terrorist
CS rT
“Terrorist”
“All Muslims are terrorists”
US RM (rM – rT)
Muslim
rT rT
Figure 1. Following Mowrer’s nomenclature, capital letters with a subscript refer to responses that are elicited by thing-stimuli, while lowercase letters 
with a subscript refer to a subset of them that is elicited by sign-stimuli [mediational response]; signs are represented by words in quotes and things by 
words alone
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through an ostensive defi nition (that is, pointing at the referent 
while naming it); if so, it would be impossible to discriminate the 
correct sign-referent association (“apple”-apple vs. “apple”-red 
or “apple”-round shape). Ostensive defi nitions offer the occasion 
for the establishment of sign-referent associations, but they don’t 
provide the rules of use of such terms. According to Wittgenstein 
(1953), learning new meanings implies learning how to play 
new “language-games”, that is, how words are to be employed. 
From a behaviorist perspective, we could thus say that it isn’t the 
mere pairing of signs and referents, but the progressive shaping 
of verbal behavior by a sociolinguistic community that enables 
a person to discriminate between correct and incorrect ways to 
employ a term. In Tonneau’s terms, this regular verbal shaping 
would establish stable correlations between sign-stimuli and thing-
stimuli, which would in turn give rise to “socially appropriate” 
functional equivalence relations.
Consequently, understanding how operant and Pavlovian 
processes contribute together to the genesis, maintenance and 
change of symbolic processes is a must for a full-fl edged behavioral 
characterization of language. In addition, understanding how 
the learning of verbal operants in the “here-and-now” can 
affect our behavior in the “not here, not now” is essential to 
understand clinical change, which is usually effected throughout 
a fundamentally verbal interaction. Finally, the characterization 
of (linguistic) thoughts in terms of covert verbal behavior with a 
causal role in the maintenance and change of other behaviors is 
also key to achieve a full comprehension of how language shapes 
our interaction with the environment. 
Discussion
The question to be addressed now is whether it is possible 
to maintain our conceptualization of cognitive techniques as 
verbal procedures that can be explained in terms of associative 
processes.
In view of the above, when cognitive therapists observe 
the clients’ manifest behavior and conclude that they are just 
witnessing the manifestation of an inner causal process, they are 
reifying “cognitive schemata” and confusing a normative with 
a nomological explanation. From an anti-factualist perspective, 
“cognitive schema” does not allude to a concrete entity. Rather, 
it is a term that cognitive therapists use to rationally characterize 
the patterns of dysfunctional behavior shown by their clients. The 
reason why they cannot access their cognitive schemata through 
self-observation is not that these are consciously inaccessible, but 
that they are just linguistic tools to normatively explain behavior. 
However, clients do observe their “automatic thoughts” and 
how these control their behavior in certain circumstances. We 
propose to regard them as behaviors –thus, factual entities- that 
can be functionally analyzed and that needn’t be at the root of 
the psychological problem, but rather constitute another part of 
it. It could seem that we are oversimplifying human complexity 
when we assert that thought is one more element of the possible 
functional associations between S-stimuli and R-responses. We 
wholeheartedly disagree with that impression: in the same way 
that musical symphonies can be composed using only seven 
notes, S-R-S functional relations may generate extremely complex 
behaviors.
Consequently, cognitive techniques can be conceived as verbal 
techniques, since they operate through speech and on linguistic 
thought (manifest verbal behavior that was socially learnt and 
then internalized). Even more importantly, this explains how 
verbal interaction in therapy can modify the client’s extra-clinical 
behavior. Accordingly, tautological mind constructs whose 
logical type entails a category error are no longer needed. The 
very name of “cognitive technique” would thus be incorrect, and 
any explanation of their functioning could be extended to any 
therapeutic interaction (Ruiz-Sancho, Froján-Parga, & Galván-
Domínguez, 2015).
Contextual therapies, which are revolutionary in their return 
to radical behaviorism, proposed an operant-based explanation 
of private events that focused on verbal behavior (Catania, 1968; 
Luciano, 1993; Unturbe, 2004). Verbal Behavior (Skinner, 1957) 
was the starting point for the development of Functional Analytic 
Psychotherapy (FAP, Kohlenberg & Tsai, 1991) and Acceptance 
and Commitment Therapy (ACT, Hayes & Wilson, 1994; Hayes 
et al., 1999); both proposed that therapy involved a great deal of 
talking, but therapists did not handle speech as verbal behavior. 
They retrieved the research on equivalence relations (Sidman, 
1971), whose experimental results allowed for a behavioral 
understanding of various cognitive constructs (Dougher, 1998). 
Behavior was defi ned as a three-term contingency whose 
combination results in a multiple causality that might generate 
extremely complex behaviors. The concept of rule and the 
distinction between “rule-governed” and “contingency-shaped” 
behaviors (Catania, Shimoff, & Matthews, 1989; Skinner, 1957, 
1969) were also recovered.
Our proposal largely agrees with contextual therapies, but 
it also retrieves Pavlovian conditioning as a tool for language 
analysis. We consider that Mowrer, Tonneau and Wittgenstein’s 
approaches complement each other and strengthen our proposal of 
combining classical and operant processes to study language and 
speech.  This allows us to dispense with the weakest foundations 
of third wave therapies: the Relational Frame Theory (RFT, Hayes 
et al., 2001), criticized by various authors (Tonneau, 2001, 2004). 
From our perspective, the RFT is a triple mortal leap of faith from 
its base on matching-to-sample research (Pérez-Fernández, 2015; 
Sidman, 1971; Sidman & Tailby, 1982).
We propose that the study of the language-cognition-behavior 
triad in terms of associative learning processes offers a plausible 
alternative explanation for psychological therapy in general and 
cognitive techniques in particular (Froján-Parga, Montaño-
Fidalgo, Calero Elvira, & Ruiz-Sancho, 2011; Montaño, Calero, 
& Froján, 2006). From our perspective, not all psychological 
problems are caused by an inadequate cognitive functioning 
(the cornerstone of cognitive therapies); on the contrary, the 
function of linguistic thoughts in each specifi c problem should be 
established. Occasionally, a functional analysis might show that 
there’s a defective verbal control that causes problematic behavior. 
In such cases, modifying that control by means of cognitive-verbal 
techniques like the Socratic method could be convenient. This 
technique can be conceived as a combination of verbal shaping 
and chaining processes: verbalizations that approach the desirable 
pro-therapeutic utterances are discriminated and reinforced, 
while those that move away from the target utterance are punished 
or extinguished (Calero-Elvira, Froján-Parga, Ruiz-Sancho, & 
Alpañés-Freitag, 2013; Froján-Parga & Calero-Elvira, 2011).
However, the operant approach cannot single-handedly explain 
how these verbalizations modify the client’s behavior in extra-
clinical settings where neither the verbalization nor the described 
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operant have been reinforced. A certain analogy to the emergence 
of derived responses in matching-to-sample procedures can be 
drawn here (see Pérez-Fernández, 2015; Tonneau, 2001). Here, 
RFT introduces the concept of “relational behavior”: the behavior 
of establishing associations, ultimately responsible for “function 
transformation” (the change of a stimulus function due to its 
pairing with other stimuli). RFT questions this to be an exclusively 
operant functional transfer phenomenon and develops the concept 
of “relational frame” to explain it (Hayes et al., 2001).
The relational frame is nonetheless a controversial concept 
(Tonneau, 2001, 2002, 2004) that fails to account for the deferred 
control that the therapist’s intervention has over the client’s 
behavior. Instead, Mowrer’s mediating response can explain how 
the intervention in clinical contexts can directly affect behaviors 
in extra-clinical settings. The therapist’s appetitive or aversive 
utterances that follow some of the client’s verbalizations not only 
reinforce/punish the client’s verbal behavior, but also associate the 
client’s emotional response as the addressee of those reinforcing/
punishing utterances with the response elicited by the client’s own 
verbalizations. In other words: the Mowrerian meanings of the 
client and the therapist’s verbalizations are associated. Through 
subsequent sign-sign pairings, the thing-stimulus referred to by 
the client’s utterance may start to elicit responses similar to those 
elicited by the sign-stimulus (that is, a meaning transfer is achieved). 
The therapist’s job would thus be to expose the client to utterances 
that elicit responses in line with the therapeutic objectives. Since 
such utterances are functionally equivalent to their referents, we 
can explain the behavioral change towards a thing-stimulus as 
a result of the meaning transfer between two words in sign-sign 
sentences (that is, without directly pairing the thing-stimulus with 
the emotional response). The Pavlovian association between the 
responses elicited by the client’s utterances and those elicited by 
the therapist’s might not be extinguished because the client’s new 
behaviors that result from this association are useful in Tonneau’s 
(2001) terms: they allow the client to access reinforcing situations. 
The role of operant conditioning would thus be to maintain the 
functional equivalence relations established through Pavlovian 
processes. Consequently, both kinds of conditioning act conjointly 
during the therapeutic intervention.
We believe that this explanation is undoubtedly more 
parsimonious than the tautological cognitive models that account 
for human behavior in terms of causal entities of a dubious 
ontological character. Withdrawing those entities from our causal 
analyses and embracing an explanation based on the combination 
of classical and operant conditioning can only enhance the 
theoretical solidity and experimental possibilities of research on 
clinical change. The Pavlovian analysis of language bridges the 
gap between clinical and extra-clinical settings. Specifi cally, the 
concept of mediating response explains how behavioral change 
is achieved without the need to directly train behavior in relation 
to the thing-stimuli. This is immensely interesting given the 
diffi culty –or rather impossibility– of a direct and not verbally-
mediated intervention in the client’s everyday settings. In sum, 
this approach opens many promising ways for a solid development 
of psychological treatments. 
We don’t consider this return to the behavioral origins of 
cognitive techniques to constitute a retrogression, but rather 
a leap forward that helps us bypass the theoretical dead end in 
which contextualist schools are stuck due to their almost exclusive 
emphasis on operant conditioning. We also consider it to be more 
philosophically and scientifi cally sound than any alternative 
proposed by CBM, whose dualistic and tautological model has led 
to the stagnation (and probably retrogression) of the experimental 
development of psychological intervention.
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